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Abstract
What is the relationship between the design of regulations and levels of individual compliance? To
answer this question, Crawford and Ostrom’s institutional grammar tool is used to deconstruct
regulations governing the aquaculture industry in Colorado, USA. Compliance with the decon-
structed regulatory components is then assessed based on the perceptions of the appropriateness of
the regulations, involvement in designing the regulations, and intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
The findings suggest that levels of compliance with regulations vary across and within individuals
regarding various aspects of the regulatory components. As expected, the level of compliance is
affected by the perceived appropriateness of regulations, participation in designing the regulations,
and feelings of guilt and fear of social disapproval. Furthermore, there is a strong degree of
interdependence among the written components, as identified by the institutional grammar tool, in
affecting compliance levels. The paper contributes to the regulation and compliance literature by
illustrating the utility of the institutional grammar tool in understanding regulatory content,
applying a new Q-Sort technique for measuring individual levels of compliance, and providing a
rare exploration into feelings of guilt and fear outside of the laboratory setting.
Keywords: deconstructing rules, institutional grammar tool, Q-Sort, regulatory compliance,
regulatory design.
1. Introduction
Understanding the extent of compliance with regulations has long been a challenge in the
study of governance. The challenge partly entails developing a systematic deconstruction
of the written components (e.g. target populations, requirements, sanctions, conditions)
within the regulations. Such regulatory components can be extensive, multifaceted, and
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interactive by comprising dozens to hundreds of statements that forbid, permit, and
require specific actions by targeted populations under certain situations. Another part of
the challenge involves the applicability of the regulatory components with the contextual
situations. Some regulations are locally tailored and perceived as appropriate to the
contextual situations faced by the targeted actors, which, at least hypothetically, increase
the possibility of compliance (Ostrom 2005). Additionally, regulatory compliance takes
place among people making decisions based on intrinsic motivations (e.g. feelings of
guilt) and extrinsic motivations (e.g. formal sanctions) (Becker 1968; Zimring & Hawkins
1973; Grasmick & Bursik 1990). Integrating these different parts of the challenge in
understanding compliance and regulations, this paper seeks to contribute to knowledge
about compliance by analyzing the written components within regulations in conjunc-
tion with perceived regulatory appropriateness, involvement in designing the regulations,
and intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
To deconstruct and understand the components of regulations, this paper uses the
institutional grammar tool (IGT), initially formulated by Crawford and Ostrom (1995)
and later revised by Basurto et al. (2010) and Siddiki et al. (2011). The IGT provides the
means to partition the content of regulations into single statements or directives and,
then, to identify the major constitutive components of these statements. These compo-
nents can then be analyzed and configured to depict the behaviors that are required,
permitted, and forbidden for actors under different contexts. Most importantly, regula-
tory deconstruction, guided by the IGT, helps isolate the particular components within
regulations that can then be linked to compliant and noncompliant behaviors. For
example, in one situation, noncompliance of a required behavior might result from the
regulations not specifying the appropriate condition (time and place). In another situa-
tion, noncompliance might result from the target population interpreting the obligation
as something permitted rather than required. Both situations of noncompliance neces-
sitate a detailed understanding of regulatory design in addition to the perceptions and
interpretations of actors in the regulatory system.
Compliance is examined in a case study of aquaculture regulations in Colorado,
United States. Aquaculture is the practice of farming aquatic organisms (e.g. fish, shell-
fish, algae) (USGS 1996) for food markets, for restocking lakes and rivers, and for
ornamental purposes (e.g. aquariums). The aquaculture industry is regulated throughout
its life cycle: siting the aquaculture facility, obtaining water rights, acquiring effluent
permits, assessing species health, acquiring feed, and transporting the product to its final
destination (Ackefors et al. 1994). In the diversification and growth of global food
systems, aquaculture is one of the fastest growing industries worldwide (Naylor et al.
2001). Aquaculture regulation is also understudied with most research to date in the US
commenting on the cacophony of federal and state regulations (Firestone et al. 2004). To
study regulatory compliance in the aquaculture industry, we selected Colorado as a case
study because the industry is typical in size (USDA 2006) and because regulations that
govern the industry are encompassed in just four different documents, making it feasible
to code them in their entirety. Compliance with regulations in Colorado aquaculture is
assessed through semi-structured interviews with regulators and regulatees. The paper
finds that compliance varies across the interviewees and even within the same inter-
viewee. Compliance levels are shaped by perceptions of the appropriateness of the regu-
lations, participation in designing the regulations, feelings of guilt, and fear of social
disapproval.
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2. Introducing the institutional grammar tool
Using the logic of the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Ostrom
1990), Crawford and Ostrom (1995) attempted to unify the different interpretations of
institutions as well as to offer an “institutional grammar” to understand institutional
content. The institutional grammar provided a general approach for deconstructing the
components of formal institutions: for example, the target audiences, topical subjects,
prescriptive operators, and sanctions included within formal institutions such as policies,
laws, and regulations. Their approach was innovative but lacked specific instructions for
putting the institutional grammar into practice. As a result, the institutional grammar
was largely ignored for the better part of the last two decades.
Recent efforts by Basurto et al. (2010) and Siddiki et al. (2011) have transformed the
institutional grammar into the institutional grammar tool (IGT). Using the IGT, one can
deconstruct regulations to increasing specificity: first, by parsing the written policies
into institutional statements; and, second, by parsing institutional statements into
components.
Crawford and Ostrom define institutional statements as “a shared linguistic con-
straint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advises actions or outcomes for actors
(both individual and corporate)” (Crawford & Ostrom 1995, p. 583). Most often, but not
always, institutional statements are single sentences within regulations. Institutional
statements represent the individual regulatory directives that specify certain components:
at a minimum, an actor, a specific activity, and the temporal, spatial, or procedural
boundaries of the activity. Each of the following sentences is an example of an institu-
tional statement that might be identified and isolated from a regulatory document:
Aquaculture producers must annually reapply for an aquaculture permit or face
closure of their facility.
Aquaculture producers may not export any fish exhibiting clinical signs of a pro-
hibited disease.
Aquaculture producers may import certain types of prohibited species for research
or educational purposes provided that the appropriate permits are obtained.
Once the institutional statements within a given regulation are identified, the state-
ments are further parsed into six components: (i) Attributes, or the agent(s) charged with
performing a particular action; (ii) oBjects, the animate or inanimate part of the state-
ment that is the receiver of an action; (iii) Deontics, the prescriptive operator that
specifies whether an action is required, allowed, or forbidden; (iv) aIms, or the action
itself; (v) Conditions, which specify the spatial, temporal, and/or procedural boundaries
in which the action in question is to be performed; and (vi) Or elses, the punitive
sanctions associated with not performing an action as prescribed.1 Not all components
must be present within any given institutional statement. At a minimum, institutional
statements must contain three components: Attribute, aIm, and Condition. Table 1 pro-
vides an example of an institutional statement coded using the IGT, along with defini-
tions of each component.
Recent applications of the IGT have sought to establish reliable coding guidelines,
clarify the conceptual definitions of individual components, and provide insight regard-
ing its practical and theoretical utility (Speer 2008; Basurto et al. 2010; Schlüter & Thees-
feld 2010; Siddiki et al. 2011). For example, Basurto et al. (2010) and Siddiki et al. (2011)
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explored the utility of the IGT in comprehensively identifying the array of opportunities
and constraints available to policy actors in various action situations, demonstrated how
actors are linked across levels of analysis, and uncovered how the different components of
institutional statements interact to animate the behavior of policy actors. Finally, seeking
to demonstrate its versatility, Siddiki et al. (2011) described the tool’s methodological
applicability to understand the role of policy designs and the actors described within
them in communities.
3. Influencing regulatory compliance
Two general categories of interdependent factors are examined for influencing individ-
uals’ compliance with regulations: regulatory design factors and intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations.
3.1. Regulatory design factors
One important factor concerning the design of regulations is examining whether the
scope of regulations is perceived as accurately reflecting the array of day-to-day activities
of the individuals mentioned in the documents, including regulatees and regulatory
officials. That is, are regulations relevant and appropriate to individuals mentioned
therein? When the regulations are not perceived as appropriate, regulators and regulatees
may question the legitimacy of the regulations and choose not to comply (Bardach &
Kagan 1982; Levi 1988; Ostrom 1990; May 2005, p. 321).
Another factor that has been demonstrated to influence the degree of relevance and
applicability of regulations is participation in designing the regulations by those most
likely affected by them (Ostrom 1990, 2005). Ostrom (1990) repeatedly demonstrated in
her study of institutional design principles for effective common pool resource gover-
nance, that institutions are more likely to be representative of the realities of those
affected by them when the latter have had the opportunity to participate in the institu-
Table 1 Example coding of an institutional statement: Facility owners shall annually submit a
permit renewal application or pay a fine
Component
[ABDICO]
Component definition Coding of example statement
Attribute Agents charged with performing a particular
action
Facility owners
oBject Animate or inanimate part of the statement
that is the receiver of an action
A permit renewal application
Deontic Prescriptive operator that specifies whether
an action is required, allowed, or forbidden
Shall
aIm Action Submit
Condition Spatial, temporal, and/or procedural
boundaries in which an action is to be
performed
Annually
Or else Punitive sanction associated with not
performing an action as prescribed
Or pay a fine
Institutional grammar toolS. Siddiki et al.
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd170
tional design process.2 A natural presumption is that locally tailored institutions will
likely be more effective in fostering compliance.
In sum, we operationalize and measure the two regulatory design factors as the extent
of perceived regulatory appropriateness and reported levels of participation in regulatory
design.
3.2. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
Individuals are embedded in institutional, community, and physical/geographic contexts
that may apply pressure to conform toward compliance or non-compliance of regula-
tions. When making decisions, it is assumed that individuals consider such complemen-
tary or contradictory pressures to ascertain a course of action. Complicating this process,
individuals’ information is imperfect, as is their decision-making calculus; that is, they
are boundedly rational (Simon 1985).
Taking all the above into account, we focus on three externally and internally derived
motivations that shape individuals’ compliance with regulations: fear of monetary sanc-
tioning, fear of social disapproval, and feelings of personal guilt. Fear or monetary
sanctioning and fear of social disapproval are both characterized as extrinsic motivations
and feelings of guilt are characterized as an intrinsic motivation. A fear of monetary
sanctions relates to the sanctions prescribed in regulations for non-compliance whereas
fear of social disapproval relates to reputational concerns among fellow community
members.3 Studies of individual decision making behavior have found, inter alia, the
following factors to be influential in relation to these intrinsic and extrinsic motivations:
(i) involvement of community members in labor unions (Offe & Wisenthal 1980); (ii)
change in resource availability with use (Hirschman 1985; Olson 1991; Mansbridge
1994); (iii) involvement of community members in rule development (Frey 1994); and
(iv) perceived legitimacy of rules (Ostrom 2005). For the purposes of this study, such
variables are characterized as “contingent variables,” meaning that the extent to which
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations will be expressed in individuals’ decision making is
contingent upon a variety of community-based, bio-physical, and higher-level institu-
tional variables, plus individual situational and endogenous norms (e.g. moral and cog-
nitive bias). Individual situational factors are those that relate to individuals’ personal
circumstances, such as the length of time they have been employed in a particular
occupation or lived in a certain location. For example, the degree to which the fear of
social disapproval (primary compliance motivation) is a motivating (or demotivating)
factor for an individual to comply with institutional directives may be tempered by the
length of time s/he has resided within a particular community (contingent motivation).
This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of compliance by analyzing
regulatory components in conjunction with regulatory design factors as well as intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations. We offer four specific research questions in an attempt to gain
a better understanding of the degree of regulatory compliance:
RQ1: To what extent are the descriptions of situations described in regulations
reported by interviewees as representing their day-to-day activities?
RQ2: To what extent do perceived regulatory appropriateness and participation in
designing regulations influence individuals’ compliance with regulations?
RQ3: To what extent do fear of monetary sanctioning, fear of social disapproval,
and/or feelings of personal guilt influence individual decisions to comply with
regulations?
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RQ4: Which contingent factors are most influential in shaping the expression of
compliance motivations?
4. Methods of data collection and analysis
To respond to the posited research questions, we applied two distinct but related meth-
odologies. First, we identified and coded the regulations to analyze the prescribed set of
written required, allowable, and forbidden actions. Second, we used a dual interview
approach applying a semi-structured interview protocol and related Q-Sort technique to
assess the degree of congruency between prescribed and actual behavior and to uncover
how actors weigh compliance motivations when deciding whether to adhere to prescrip-
tions within the regulations.
4.1. Identifying and coding Colorado aquaculture regulations
The two primary agencies charged with the regulation of aquaculture in Colorado State
are the Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDoA) and the Colorado Division of
Wildlife (CDoW). The CDoA is responsible for permitting procedures relating to aquac-
ulture and has two complementary legislative documents: the Colorado Aquaculture Act
(CAA) Statute (CDoA 1991) and the Rules Pertaining to the Administration and Enforce-
ment of the Colorado Aquaculture Act (CDoA 1992). Together, these two documents
detail the structure and responsibilities of the Aquaculture Board, specify the fee structure
for different types of aquaculture permits, and provide administrative instructions for
aquaculture producers; for example, these documents include directives pertaining to
record keeping of aquaculture acquisitions, destruction of aquatic organisms, and the sale
of aquaculture products. The CDoW deals with matters of fish health and is charged with
implementing two legislative documents that deal directly with aquaculture. The first,
Article VII of the Chapter 00 – General Provisions (CDoW 1991), specifies prescribed fish
health testing, responsibilities of the State Fish Health Pathologist, and disinfection and
quarantine procedures. The second, Section 33-5.5–101 of Title 33 of the Wildlife and
Parks and Regulations Rules, outlines the responsibilities of the Fish Health Board as they
pertain to aquaculture.4
We applied the IGT to code the four regulatory documents governing aquaculture
practice in the State of Colorado. Across the four regulations 346 statements were iden-
tified. One member of the research team coded each of the four regulations in its
entirety. A second member of the research team coded 35 statements from the Colorado
Aquaculture Act Administration and Enforcement Rules, comprising approximately ten
percent of the total statements across all documents, as a test for inter-coder reliability.
Inter-coder reliability results were calculated based on agreement per statement com-
ponent. The following agreement rates were observed between the two coders on each
component: Attributes (86%), oBject (86%), Deontic (97%), aIm (94%), Condition
(80%), and Or else (100%).
To summarize the data, we conducted a basic frequency count for the four regulations
to determine the total number of statements within each document (Table 2). We also
categorized these statements by their components, that is, whether they constituted
strategies, norms, or rules. According to the IGT, a strategy is composed by an Attribute-
aIm-Condition (AIC) or Attribute-Object-aIm-Condition (ABIC) statements. A norm
is made of Attribute-Deontic-aIm-Condition (ADIC) or Attribute-Object-Deontic-
aIm-Condition (ABDIC) statements. And a rule is constituted by Attribute-Deontic-
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aIm-Condition-Or else (ADICO) or Attribute-oBject-Deontic-aIm-Condition-Or else
(ABDICO) statements. For clarity purposes in this paper, we avoided using the terms of
strategies, norms, and rules to differentiate between institutional statements because all
statements in formal institutions – coded as part of this project – are regulations, which
could be interpreted as rules because there is an implicit “Or else” present. We considered
the documentation of the relative frequency of each categorization (i.e. AIC/ABIC, ADIC/
ABDIC, ADICO/ABDICO statements) as useful to provide better understanding of the
content of regulations. Completing the descriptive summary of the regulations is a
frequency count to determine the actual Attributes, oBjects, and Deontics most fre-
quently occurring within each. A simplified descriptive summary of Conditions is not
feasible in the current paper given the range of specific Conditions associated with
regulatory directives. Very few statements in the regulations coded for this exercise
contained Or elses and, thus, a descriptive summary for this code is also not provided in
Table 2.
In summarizing the Attributes, oBjects, and Deontics within each of the regulations
in this manner, we explored how the components from institutional statements were
intended to cumulatively structure individuals’ behavior (Ostrom 2005, p. 175). Addi-
tionally, we identified the modal Attributes (that is, the category of people most com-
monly listed in the regulations) and various characteristics and activities regarding them.
Each of the modal Attributes from the four regulations was linked with the actions in the
aIm, oBjects, related Deontics, and sometimes Conditions. Through this exercise, we were
able to gain a better understanding of how the different Attributes present within the
regulations were linked via four Deontics (must, must not, may, may not) to certain
activities. Table 3 provides examples of statements linked with three different types of
Attributes – Fish Health Board, Colorado Department of Agriculture, and Facility
Owners and Operators – and the Deontics assigned to these statements.
For a more complete depiction, Figure 1 shows each of the statements linked with a
particular Attribute from the regulations – the Fish Health Board.
In addition to allowing one to start understanding the activities associated with
particular actors, a mapping of institutional statements was also necessary as it served as
the basis for the second round of data collection via formal interviews. For example, the
modal Attributes formed the sample pool for the interviews. Additionally, individual
institutional statements were used as the preselected statements that interviewees would
be asked to sort during the Q-Sort exercise.
4.2. Interviews
The sample of interview participants included modal actors from the four regulations
coded for the exercise, including four facility owners and/or operators (i.e. aquaculture
producers), the Colorado State Fish Health Pathologist, one representative from the
Colorado Department of Agriculture, one member of the Colorado Aquaculture Board,
and one member of the Fish Health Board. Both the member of the Colorado Aquac-
ulture Board and the Fish Health Board were also facility owners and/or operators. A
total of seven formal, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Some of the inter-
viewees have multiple roles in the aquaculture community (eg. Fish Health Board
member and facility owner) and this was reflected in their responses to interview ques-
tions in which they provided answers from the perspective of each of the positions
held.
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The interviews consisted of two parts. In the first part, interviewees were asked a series
of questions based on a formal, structured interview protocol. In the second part, inter-
viewees were asked to participate in a Q-Sort exercise. The Q-Sort is a methodological
technique that allows study participants to subjectively sort a preselected set of statements
into a set of categories designated by the researcher (McKeown & Thomas 1988). Sample
statements can be chosen following an unstructured or structured approach. In the latter,
the researcher chooses the statements that will be sorted based upon prior collected
information, such as through preliminary interviews or from the examination of existing
documents.
5. Results
5.1. Interview part 1: Protocol-based interview – examining contextual
appropriateness of regulations
Questions asked during interviews were directly related to the interviewee’s role and
responsibilities as presented in the regulations. Questions were structured around state-
ment components from the IGT (Attributes, oBjects, Deontics, etc.) and catered for the
particular position/role of the interviewee in the aquaculture community as prescribed in
the coded regulation. A list of grammar-related interview questions can be found in the
Appendix.
Must [D]
Fish Health Board 
[A] 
Act [I] upon a vote of a 
majority of those present 
[C] 
Convey [I] proposed rules 
disapproved by the fish 
heath board [B] to the 
Commission [C]
Review [I] any destruction 
or quarantine orders [B]
Approve [I] all destruction 
or quarantine orders [B]
Review [I] destruction or 
quarantine regulations [B]
Recommend [I]
appropriate changes to 
regulations [B] to the 
Wildlife Commissioner 
[C]
Send [I] approved 
proposed rules [B] to the 
Commission with an 
adoption recommendation 
[C]
Vote [I] on the approval or 
disapproval of any 
proposed rule [C]
Review or initiate and 
consider [I] every rule [B]Exercise [I] powers [B]
Constitute [I] a “public 
entity” [B]
Elect [I] a Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman [B]
annually [C]
Meet [I] at least once a 
year [C]
May [D] Must not [D]
Perform [I] its duties [B]
Figure 1 Attribute cluster analysis: Fish Health Board.
Note: [A] = Attribute; [B] = oBject; [D] = Deontic; [I] = aIm; [C] = Condition of the statement.
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The formal interview protocol included a number of questions relating to the history
and context of the regulations, regulatory compliance, and regulatory effectiveness.
However, analysis of interview data focused primarily on questions related to the
grammar components to understand the utility and theoretical relevance of parsing
institutional statements by Attributes, oBjects, Deontics, aIms, Conditions, and Or elses.
With respect to Attributes (performers of actions in the regulations), five out of the seven
interviewees stated that they represented the appropriate target audience for the respec-
tive regulations, including four facility owners, one of whom was also a member of the
Fish Health Board, and the State Fish Health Pathologist. In most cases these individuals
stated that regulations appropriately targeted them as being important in the functioning
of the aquaculture industry in Colorado. Level of influence within the aquaculture
community was also cited as a reason for the appearance of certain actors in the regula-
tions. For example, the member of the Fish Health Board, the entity charged with
approving most mandates within aquaculture regulations in Colorado, stated that the
Board was very influential in shaping the aquaculture industry in the State.
Those who stated that they were not the appropriate target audience of the regulation,
including a representative from the State Department of Agriculture and a member of the
Colorado Aquaculture Board, stated that their frequent mention in the regulations over-
stated their influence in the management of the aquaculture industry. With respect to the
Colorado Aquaculture Board, the member stated that the Board was only called upon
under certain circumstances to perform the activities described in the regulations, while
the regulations make it appear that the Board was performing these activities on a regular
basis. The Colorado Department of Agriculture representative described how many of
the regulatory responsibilities assigned to it were performed jointly by the Department
and the Colorado Division of Wildlife, even though the regulations suggested the Colo-
rado Department of Agriculture was the sole actor.
Regarding the oBject questions (questions related to the activities described in the
regulations vis-à-vis Attributes), we were interested in knowing if the number of activities
prescribed to a particular actor/entity provided an indication regarding the scope of
aquaculture activities s/he/it was regularly involved in, as well as the level of influence
of the Attribute. For example, if an individual was associated with a larger number of
activities, does this mean that his/her scope of activities and/or influence was commen-
surately greater? Of the six interviewees that responded to this question, three responded
that the regulations accurately portrayed the scope of their activities relating to aquac-
ulture, while three said the regulations did not. Of those who responded positively, two
remarked that the nature of their work in aquaculture was highly specialized and, thus,
they were related to relatively few activities that were substantively narrow. One inter-
viewee commented that regulations defined the scope of activities as they related to
particular actors and, thus, consistency was observed between prescribed and actual
activities. Of those who responded negatively, one interviewee stated that regulations
provided an inaccurate representation regarding his role in the aquaculture community,
which had waned in recent years. Another noted that, while the group he represented was
not associated with many activities in the regulations, the content of the relatively few
activities mentioning his group reflected the group’s broad-reaching influence. In other
words, one must not only consider the number of activities associated with an actor
mentioned in the regulations, but also the types and implications of the activities. Some
types of activities were more significant in terms of the level of impact than others. The
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third interviewee, a facility owner, indicated that Conditions dictated whether or not a
particular activity within the regulation was relevant to a particular person. In other
words, there were a wide variety of activities described in the regulations in relation to
facility owners, not all of which were applicable to everyone. Applicability was based on
Conditions that specify to whom certain activities apply and under which circumstances.
For example, certain fish health testing requirements may or may not have been appli-
cable to a particular facility owner depending on whether or not his/her facility had ever
tested positive for certain types of diseases in the past.
Regarding the aIm/Deontic question (questions that described activities as well as
whether such activities were required, forbidden, or permitted), of the five interviewees
that responded to this question, three stated that they interpreted prescriptive operators
very literally and two stated that they interpreted the different prescriptive operators with
some degree of leniency. One of the latter interviewees, charged with enforcing regula-
tions, elaborated that his interpretation of the regulations was based largely on a case-
by-case base determination of the perceived appropriateness of a prescription in relation
to a farmer’s activities. He then stated that, oftentimes, non-compliance with regulations
had minor or negligible implications.
For the Condition question (questions that described when and how activities were to
be conducted), all five interviewees expressed that the Conditions were extremely impor-
tant in determining their compliance levels. The State Fish Health Pathologist, for
example, mentioned that detailed conditions were written to provide clarity regarding
what was required, allowed, and forbidden when conducting fish health testing and
inspections. For example, the regulations specified that inspections must be conducted
annually and that they must be conducted in accordance with guidelines specified by the
US Fish and Wildlife Service and the American Fisheries Society. The Fish Health Board
member stated that Conditions were a major consideration when hearing cases of non-
compliance to determine a violator’s sanction. He further stated that Conditions largely
shaped his interpretation of the regulatory Deontics and associated phrases. For example,
a “must” was really only a “must” under certain conditions, and the same goes for other
types of Deontics. For instance, in the following example, facility owners were not
permitted to operate a facility that had tested positive for the fish disease Myxobolus
cerebralis (M.c.) unless certain exemptions had been granted to him/her by the relevant
authorities: “No person shall [i.e. a person shall not] operate a salmonid fish production
facility which has been diagnosed positive for Myxobolus cerebralis in salmonid habitat
unless an exemption allowing such operation has been granted by the Director after
consultation with the Fish Health Board” (CDoW 2009). The presence of such an impor-
tant exemption would temper how a facility owner interpreted the “must not” Deontic
included within this statement. Additionally, one administrative representative com-
mented that many times the Conditions upon which decisions were made were not
formally written in legislation but were rather informally considered based on particular
circumstances. He stated that this was particularly true for cases that were viewed as less
serious. Where cases of non-compliance were more serious, a stricter adherence to
formally stated Conditions was used.
Across the four regulations, very few statements contained Or else components (i.e.
sanctions). Interviewees were asked to provide their opinion on this finding. Of the seven
individuals that responded to this question, three stated that this was due to a lack of
enforcement capacity by regulating agencies. Two interviewees stated that, as those indi-
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viduals responsible for enforcing rules, they preferred to deal with non-compliance issues
on a case-by-case basis rather than imposing blanket penalties within regulations. Both
individuals stated that the observed leniency largely reflected the desire to maintain
harmonious relations between regulating agencies and members of the industry.
5.2. Interview part 2: Q-sort – examining compliance
For the second part of the interviews, we conducted a Q-Sort exercise with interview
participants. Five individuals participated in the Q-Sort exercise to conduct a total of six
sorts. One interviewee, who held dual positions in the aquaculture community, con-
ducted two sorts and the remaining participants conducted one sort each.
For our analysis, we used a modified, structured Q-Sort in which each study partici-
pant was given a set of cards containing statements that describe activities that relate to
his/her position in relation to aquaculture as prescribed in one of the four regulatory
documents analyzed in this study. The participant was asked if s/he “must,” “must not,”
“may,” or “may not” perform the activity described on the card based on adopted prac-
tices. For example, facility owners were given a card containing the following statement
with the “may” Deontic removed: “Destroy or hold in quarantine fish with prohibited
diseases at the owner’s expense.” The interviewee was then asked to place this statement
into the Deontic category which best reflects how s/he performs this activity in his/her
own operation; that is, whether his/her actual activities reflects his/her interpretation of
the activities being specified on this card as being required, allowed, forbidden, and so on.
We chose to use the Q-Sort technique in our interviews as we felt it would allow us to
capture the daily behaviors exhibited by interviewees, which we could then formally and
systematically compare to the formal institutions. Once the sorting exercise was com-
pleted, the researcher asked the participant to explain the placement of statements.
Follow-up questions were structured around pro-factual and counterfactual prompts as
well as probes relating to the interviewees’ motivations in performing/not performing
prescribed activities. Additionally, interviewees were asked to articulate how they inter-
preted and weighted different prescriptive operators.
Q-Sort data were first analyzed by calculating the percent alignment between the
content of actual regulatory statements and interviewees’ description of their activities as
reflected in their placement of Q-card statements into the four different Deontic catego-
ries. The results from this exercise are provided in Table 4. For each attribute, the table
displays the total number of “must,” “must not,” “may,” and “may not” statements in
respective regulations, the number of statements placed in each of the Deontic categories
by the participant, the number of statements correctly identified, and the percent agree-
ment between the placement of the Deontic by the participant and the actual Deontic in
the regulation.
The average percentage agreement across the Deontic categories differed markedly
across the different Attributes, ranging from 17 percent to 66 percent. Agreement tended
to be higher for “must” Deontics, implying that interviewees were most knowledgeable
about activities they were required to perform in their actual aquaculture practices. This
finding is an indication that, while the average agreement across Deontic categories was
relatively low in some cases, instances of non-compliance were not likely characteristic of
gross negligence. Further, many individuals may reference documents for clarification on
activities allowed and forbidden before taking action in a real situation, while the Q-Sort
exercise relies to some extent on their recall of regulations.
Institutional grammar tool S. Siddiki et al.
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 179
Ta
bl
e
4
Q
-S
or
t
an
al
ys
es
re
su
lt
s
D
eo
n
ti
c
To
ta
ls
ta
te
m
en
ts
in
re
gu
la
ti
on
N
u
m
be
r
of
st
at
em
en
ts
pl
ac
ed
in
de
on
ti
c
ca
te
go
ry
N
u
m
be
r
of
st
at
em
en
ts
co
rr
ec
tl
y
id
en
ti
fi
ed
Pe
rc
en
t
ag
re
em
en
t
A
ve
ra
ge
ag
re
em
en
t
St
at
e
Fi
sh
H
ea
lt
h
Pa
th
ol
og
is
t
M
u
st
11
9
9
82
%
66
%
M
u
st
n
ot
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
M
ay
2
4
2
50
%
M
ay
n
ot
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
C
ol
or
ad
o
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
of
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
†
M
u
st
4
1
1
25
%
17
%
M
u
st
n
ot
3
0
0
0%
M
ay
1
4
1
25
%
M
ay
n
ot
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Fi
sh
H
ea
lt
h
B
oa
rd
M
em
be
r
M
u
st
11
12
10
91
%
48
%
M
u
st
n
ot
1
0
0
0%
M
ay
1
1
0
0%
M
ay
n
ot
0
0
0
10
0%
C
ol
or
ad
o
A
qu
ac
u
lt
u
re
B
oa
rd
M
em
be
r
M
u
st
11
8
6
55
%
28
%
M
u
st
n
ot
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
M
ay
2
5
0
0%
M
ay
n
ot
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
N
/A
Fa
ci
lit
y
ow
n
er
1
M
u
st
14
14
13
93
%
36
%
M
u
st
n
ot
1
1
0
0%
M
ay
2
4
1
50
%
M
ay
n
ot
2
0
0
0%
Fa
ci
lit
y
ow
n
er
2
M
u
st
13
10
10
77
%
57
%
M
u
st
n
ot
1
0
0
0%
M
ay
2
7
2
10
0%
M
ay
n
ot
2
1
1
50
%
†F
or
th
e
C
ol
or
ad
o
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
of
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
,“
To
ta
ls
ta
te
m
en
ts
in
re
gu
la
ti
on
”
an
d
“N
u
m
be
r
of
st
at
em
en
ts
pl
ac
ed
in
de
on
ti
c
ca
te
go
ry
”
do
n
ot
to
ta
lt
o
th
e
sa
m
e
am
ou
n
t
ac
ro
ss
D
eo
n
ti
c
ca
te
go
ri
es
as
th
er
e
w
er
e
th
re
e
st
at
em
en
ts
w
h
ic
h
th
e
in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
di
d
n
ot
so
rt
as
h
e
di
d
n
ot
fe
el
th
ey
ap
pl
ie
d
to
h
is
po
si
ti
on
.
Institutional grammar toolS. Siddiki et al.
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd180
An initial assessment of the relationship between perceived contextual appropriate-
ness of regulations and compliance indicates the highest agreement among interviewees
who stated that regulations accurately represent the scope of activities they were regularly
engaged in. These individuals include the State Fish Health Pathologist, member of the
Fish Health Board, and a facility owner. Further, each of these individuals also reportedly
participated in the development of regulations at one point in time.
Next, interviewees’ responses regarding the motivations that influence their choices
relating to regulatory compliance were analyzed. Of the seven interviewees who partici-
pated in the study, five responded to this set of questions. The responses given by
interviewees reveal interesting nuances regarding both the calculus of compliance moti-
vations and the contingent factors that influence their expression. In the majority of the
cases, endogenous norms were the most prevalent contingent factor emerging from a
community-derived sense of reciprocity and/or responsibility.
Two of the interviewees stated that feelings of guilt were the primary motivator
influencing their decisions regarding compliance with regulations and one interviewee
stated such feelings were the second most influential factor. One of the interviewees was
the member of the Fish Health Board, the entity charged with reviewing any rule that was
to be incorporated into the aquaculture regulations, and also a facility owner. According
to this interviewee, feelings of guilt were the primary motivator for his literal interpre-
tation of Deontics and this was grounded in his desire to promote a fair and equitable
regulatory process, both as someone involved in the development of the regulations, as
well as someone whose activities are governed by them. Another of these interviewees was
the State Fish Health Pathologist. In this interviewee’s case, feelings of guilt emerged from
implementing a prescriptive required by regulation that was not grounded in sound
scientific evidence. That is, implementing a prescriptive that he felt could be of detriment
to industry. In such cases, the interviewee stated that he would contact the authorities to
pursue amendment to the rule.
One of the interviewees, responsible for the administrative aspects of aquaculture
development in the State, indicated that social disapproval was the strongest factor in
his decision-making relating to regulations, followed shortly by feelings of guilt. He
further indicated that his fear of social disapproval from industry members in particu-
lar, for whom he had a lot of respect, led him to relax his interpretation of “must”
Deontics. He stated that he had little desire to hurt aquaculture farmers who had good
intentions but failed to meet requirements occasionally; this goes for cases when the
non-compliance had harmless implications. He stated that this was the position
adopted by the regulating agency of which he was an employee and thus the culture
of the agency toward industry was marked by a desire to maintain harmonious
relations.
Two of the interviewees that responded to these questions did not explicitly state
which compliance motivations were most influential in guiding their decisions. Instead,
however, they elaborated on the contingent factors upon which their decisions were
based. For example, one facility owner, who expressed a strong internal norm to follow
regulations as closely as possible, indicated that he felt accountable to government agen-
cies and fellow industry members to set a good example as a person of authority in the
aquaculture community. He further elaborated that while the duty to serve as a role
model in the community was not a requisite of his professional position, it was part of his
personality that he should take this responsibility upon himself. Another interviewee
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stated that facility owners in general have expressed a norm to adhere to regulatory
mandates as a part of their duty to the law.
6. Discussion
Our study was guided by the need to better understand how a deconstruction of regu-
latory design can be used to inform our understanding of regulatory compliance and
compliance motivations. In response to this need, we posed four specific research ques-
tions and found the following results:
6.1. To what extent are the descriptions of situations described in regulations
reported by interviewees as representing their day-to-day activities?
Results suggest variation in alignment between prescribed and actual activities, or com-
pliance. We find some respondents reporting strong alignment between their daily behav-
iors and the regulations and with others we found weak alignment. The results indicate
that compliance was most often observed for “must” statements prescribing required
activities. The degree of alignment on these “must” directives was influenced by perceived
scope appropriateness and participation in designing the regulations.
Underscored by our empirical results is that the extent of compliance is fundamen-
tally an empirical question and subsystem-wide claims should not be made without a
systematic investigation representing the breadth and depth of actors. Indeed, the results
show that even for the same actor or groups of actors there might simultaneously be both
strong and weak levels of compliance depending on the specific institutional statement
examined.
6.2. To what extent does perceived regulatory appropriateness and participation in
designing regulations influence individuals’ compliance with regulations?
Our initial assessment of the relationship between regulatory design factors and compli-
ance show that the highest degree of alignment between prescribed and actual behavior
was observed when interviewees reported that regulations accurately reflect their regular
scope of activities. Furthermore, these individuals, at some point in time, have partici-
pated in the development of regulations. Most disagreement between prescribed and
actual behaviors was observed when interviewees stated that regulations did not accu-
rately represent their role in the aquaculture community or where the interviewee stated
that prescriptive operators were purposefully interpreted with a degree of leniency.
Regarding institutional scope, one interviewee described how the institutions can be
constitutive in nature; that is, they created activities for constituents and also defined
whether these activities (i) were allowed, required, or forbidden; (ii) were bounded by
temporal, spatial, and procedural conditions; and (iii) were associated with specified
sanctions for non-compliance. For example, aquaculture regulations formed the admin-
istrative rules for permitting requirements and defined the ways in which aquaculture
producers must meet such requirements. The interviewee, who commented on this
quality of aquaculture regulations, described how regulations accurately defined the
scope of activities as they related to particular actors. Thus, consistency is observed
between prescribed and actual behavior.
Our empirical approach and data collection also suggest that partitioning institu-
tional statements along grammar components has theoretical and practical relevancy
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when seeking to understand the relationship between prescribed and actual activities of
community members. For example, in most cases, modal Attributes in the regulations
were the primary actors involved with the actual regulated activity, and oBjects tended to
accurately reflect the scope of their actual activities and/or influence. Understanding the
content of regulations or formal institutions using the IGT also can allow the researcher
to organize and guide the development of a rigorous questionnaire to learn about how
actual behavior compares with what is prescribed.
6.3. To what extent do fear of monetary sanctioning, fear of social disapproval,
and/or feelings of personal guilt influence individual decisions to comply
with regulations?
The results from our preliminary analysis suggest that feelings of personal guilt and fear
of social disapproval, together, might be more influential in shaping individuals’
decision-making regarding compliance with regulations than fear of monetary sanction-
ing. These assertions must be interpreted with caution given the small sample of inter-
view participants and should be verified through an experimental research design.
However, based on this study’s findings, we can tentatively conclude that, as expected,
individual and community based characteristics play a significant role in shaping indi-
viduals’ decision-making behavior alongside regulations. The extent to which feelings of
personal guilt matter will likely be contextually based, contingent upon community,
biophysical, political/regulatory, and endogenous characteristics. For example, feelings of
guilt are possibly more important than monetary sanctions for compliance when non-
compliance has the potential to affect negatively social relations and the monetary sanc-
tions are relatively trivial and rarely enforced. In other words, the expression of these is
contingent upon a variety of factors, as demonstrated by interview responses. Such
contingent factors must be explored to more fully understand how individuals internalize
and express different compliance motivations.
6.4. Which contingent factors are most influential in shaping the expression of
compliance motivations?
The data collected from the interviewees suggests that compliance motivations depend
partly upon contingent factors. Responses given by interviewees revealed that, in the
majority of the cases, endogenous norms were the most prevalent contingent factor,
emerging from community-derived norms of reciprocity and/or responsibility. For
example, when explaining their motivations to comply with regulations, interviewees
commented on personal feelings of responsibility to the industry, a desire to maintain
harmonious relations with other industry members, a desire to maintain a fair and
equitable regulatory process, and a commitment to regulations that promote scientifically
sound practices within the aquaculture industry. One interpretation of this finding
suggests that interviewees’ motivations were rooted in endogenous norms to promote
reciprocity and cohesion among members of the aquaculture community. Beyond the
four research questions, this study finds interdependencies among the components
within a particular institutional statement. For instance, we find a strong link between
Deontics (must, must not, may) and Conditions (describing when and how an action is
to be conducted). Several interviewees indicated that their interpretation of Deontics was
contingent on Conditions. For example, only observing Deontics in the regulations
would have required certain types of fish health testing by all aquaculturists. However,
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associated Conditions indicated that several fish health tests were required only by facili-
ties that have tested positive for a particular disease within a given time period.
7. Conclusions
The politics of the distribution of burdens and benefits and the very style of governance
in any society is largely determined by the design of constitutions, laws, policies, and
regulations. This paper provides an approach with the institutional grammar tool (IGT)
for deconstructing the components of regulations and then to investigate the factors
associated with regulatory compliance. The findings are fivefold:
1 Variation within and across actors in their reported level of regulatory compliance. To
assert that a community is in compliance or that even a single individual is compliant
might be a useful heuristic, but most likely a false one. Based on our small sample of
respondents, there were differences across interviewees in their reported congruence in
placing the correct Deontic (e.g. a must or a may) with the appropriate institutional
statement. Additionally, a single interviewee might report compliance with some
institutional statements and non-compliance with others. The interplay, thus,
between regulatory documents and actual behavior is probably more complex
than previously articulated, particularly if we start focusing on the minute details of
regulations.
2 Perceived appropriateness of regulatory scope seems to affect compliance and the
relevance of compliance. Scope is the extent which the regulations encompass the
range of activities conducted by actors (regulators and regulatees) involved in
the regulatory system. The results suggest that the scope of regulation determines the
level of compliance and whether compliance matters at all. For example, one might find
that a policy with ten institutional statements for actor A may encompass 90 percent
of actor A’s actual, daily activities making these ten institutional statements both
a highly congruent and fairly complete match of actual behavior, whereas
ten institutional statements for actor B may encompass only 10 percent of actor B’s
actual activities making these ten institutional statements a congruent yet incomplete
representation of actual behavior. Thus, researchers should consider both scope
and compliance when examining the relationship of regulatory components with
behavior. The IGT is particularly useful in determining the scope of regulatory design.
Through a systematic identification of aIms and oBjects, the analyst may gain a com-
prehensive understanding of the range of activities associated with different Attributes.
The coded data then serve as a foundation upon which to assess perceived scope in
relation to compliance.
3 Guilt and fear of social disapproval seem to be important factors for influencing compliance.
Regulatory scholars have acknowledged the influence of social disapproval in positively
affecting compliance, as found in this study (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991; Sutinen &
Kuperan 1999; Hatcher et al. 2000). Hatcher et al. (2000), for example, found that social
pressures served as an effective deterrent for non-compliance relating to catch quotas, or
individual fishing quotas, in the United Kingdom. This study’s findings with respect to
social disapproval are also consistent with the logic of the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework, which emphasizes the role of individual and
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community-based influences in shaping compliance with institutional, or regulatory,
directives (Ostrom 2005, pp. 26–27). Regulatory scholars have also studied the positive
influence of guilt in relation to compliance (Grasmick & Bursik 1990;
Scholz and Pinney 1995), though much of the research on guilt has been conducted
in laboratory settings (Freedman et al. 1967; Carlsmith & Gross 1969). Isolating
the influence of guilt in non-laboratory settings is certainly more challenging,
but clearly an important endeavor in light of the findings of this and past regulatory
studies.
4 The components of the IGT are interdependent. The interviews made clear that the
relationships among components of the institutional statements are interdependent.
For example, our prior expectation, perhaps naïve, was that a “must” Deontic repre-
sented required behavior independent of the Condition components of the statement.
Instead, we found that the influence of the Deontic is interdependent with the Condi-
tions.We postulate, for example, that strict temporal and process Conditions strengthen
the “must” Deontic whereas lenient temporal and process Conditions weaken the
“must”Deontic. Take an extreme example: requiring that an aquaculture producer must
submit a particular permit but without specifying a strict deadline with a Condition
severely weakens the likelihood of compliance because the aquaculture producer could
choose to submit the permit tomorrow, next year, ten years from now, or – possibly
through constant delays – never.
5 Contingent factors seem to condition the expression of compliancemotivations.Contingent
factors are the contextual forces that determine the relative weight of intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations.The findings suggest that contingent factors based on endogenous
norms to maintain reciprocity and cohesion among the aquaculture community
strongly influence the expression of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. The sample
of members of the Colorado aquaculture community across professional positions
exhibits a strong desire to maintain a fair and sympathetic process toward one another,
which has notable implications for the management of the aquaculture industry in
Colorado, and more broadly. First, maintaining a fair and sympathetic process shaped
how individuals interpret regulations, particularly the Deontics (must, must not, may).
For facility owners, this has often resulted in a more strict interpretation of Deontics,
while for those enforcing regulations, this has led to a more relaxed interpretation.
Second, maintaining a fair and sympathetic process has also influenced the design of
regulations that govern the industry. Interviewees reported that regulations were pur-
posefully non-stringent to allow for a higher degree of leniency in their interpretation
and enforcement.
One of the major challenges in studying regulatory compliance is adequate sampling
of a sizeable population of respondents to account for the individual, day-to-day behav-
iors of that population. This study involved a sample of the modal actors listed by the
regulations but not an exhaustive portrayal of the entire population. Still, this population
represents the major actor categories mentioned in the regulations and individuals
actively involved in, and knowledgeable about, Colorado aquaculture. Such a sample
limits the degree to which lessons can be drawn from the results but also represents good
breadth considering its small number. Another challenge is ascertaining which types of
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, and the contingent factors upon which their expres-
sion is based, will be most influential in complying with regulations across different
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contexts. In order to address this challenge, the motivations explored in this study must
be subjected to additional empirical testing across different regulatory contexts and,
ideally, over time.
In examining regulatory compliance, this study addresses two challenges associated
with the study of governance. First, it demonstrates how the IGT can be applied to develop
a systematic understanding of the constitutive components of regulatory design.The effort
helps develop a greater comprehension of the products of past politics and of future
politics.Among the next steps are to take the components and analyze them comparatively
and over time to describe institutional change. Second, this paper complementarily
assesses the influence of variables relating to regulatory design and behavioral motivations
relating to regulatees’ individual and community contexts on compliance. Therefore, it
serves as a solid foundation for further studies of regulatory compliance wherein it is
presumed that compliance is affected by influences emerging from both realms.
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Notes
1 The original grammar was abbreviated with the acronym ADICO (Crawford & Ostrom 1995).
The addition of the oBject added another letter ABDICO (Siddiki et al. 2011). We capitalize the
grammar components based on these letters to remind the reader that the words represent
concepts in the IGT.
2 In the literature of the IAD framework, institutional design refers to the same statements and
components described in this paper that operate in configuration in governing various action
situations. The major difference is that this paper focuses upon regulations, a specific type of
institutional design.
3 Crawford and Ostrom (1995) characterized these internally and externally derived motivations
as “delta parameters,” though herein they will be articulated more generally as intrinsic and
extrinsic compliance motivations.
4 Interviews were conducted with two members of the aquaculture community to identify these
four regulatory documents as the major policies governing aquaculturists in the State (see
Section 5).
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Appendix
Sample interview questions
These are sample interview questions based on the coding of policies using the Institu-
tional Grammar Tool.
Attribute interview question
You are one of the people [in terms of position] most often referred to in this legislation.
Does this accurately reflect your level of involvement in the aquaculture industry? Probe:
Given your knowledge of the aquaculture community, do you think [modal attribute] is
the appropriate target audience? Probe: Please describe why or why not. Probe: If not,
please describe who you think should be. Probe: Who are the other people [in terms of
position] that you think are most involved in aquaculture in the State?
Object interview question
You are/are not listed in relation to many “items.” For example, [object 1, object 2, etc.].
How do you think this reflects the scope of activities that you are involved in on a daily
basis?
Deontic and aim interview question
Some of the prescribed processes assigned to you in the legislation include [X]. How do
you interpret different prescriptive operators in relation to these [may/may not/must/
must not]? Probe: When you see a “may” and “may not” in the legislation, versus a “must”
or “must not,” what factors influence your decision to perform the directive or not?
Condition interview question
How do prescribed conditions influence how you interpret these?
Or else interview question
I noticed there are not a lot of sanctions described in the legislation for instances in which
compliance is not achieved. Why do you think this is the case?
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